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Abstract
We consider the problem of answering queries about a sensitive dataset subject to
differential privacy. The queries may be chosen adversarially from a larger setQ of allowable
queries in one of three ways, which we list in order from easiest to hardest to answer:
• Offline: The queries are chosen all at once and the differentially private mechanism
answers the queries in a single batch.
• Online: The queries are chosen all at once, but the mechanism only receives the queries
in a streaming fashion and must answer each query before seeing the next query.
• Adaptive: The queries are chosen one at a time and the mechanism must answer each
query before the next query is chosen. In particular, each query may depend on the
answers given to previous queries.
Many differentially private mechanisms are just as efficient in the adaptive model as they
are in the offline model. Meanwhile, most lower bounds for differential privacy hold in the
offline setting. This suggests that the three models may be equivalent.
We prove that these models are all, in fact, distinct. Specifically, we show that there is a
family of statistical queries such that exponentially more queries from this family can be
answered in the offline model than in the online model. We also exhibit a family of search
queries such that exponentially more queries from this family can be answered in the online
model than in the adaptive model. We also investigate whether such separations might hold
for simple queries like threshold queries over the real line.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy [DMNS06] is a formal guarantee that an algorithm run on a sensitive dataset
does not reveal too much about any individual in that dataset. Since its introduction, a rich
literature has developed to determine what statistics can be computed accurately subject to
differential privacy. For example, suppose we wish to approximate a real-valued query q(x) on
some dataset x that consists of the private data of many individuals. Then, this question has a
clean answer—we can compute a differentially private estimate of q(x) with error proportional
to the global sensitivity of q, and we cannot have smaller error in the worst case.
But how much error do we need to answer a large set of queries q1, . . . , qk? Before we can
answer this question, we have to define a model of how the queries are asked and answered.
The literature on differential privacy has considered three different interactive models1 for
specifying the queries:
• The Offline Model: The sequence of queries q1, . . . , qk are given to the algorithm together in
a batch and the mechanism answers them together.
• The Online Model: The sequence of queries q1, . . . , qk is chosen in advance and then the
mechanism must answer each query qj before seeing qj+1.
• The Adaptive Model: The queries are not fixed in advance, each query qj+1 may depend on
the answers to queries q1, . . . , qj .
In all three cases, we assume that q1, · · · ,qk are chosen from some family of allowable queries Q,
but may be chosen adversarially from this family.
Differential privacy seems well-suited to the adaptive model. Arguably its signature property
is that any adaptively-chosen sequence of differentially private algorithms remains collectively
differentially private, with a graceful degradation of the privacy parameters [DMNS06, DRV10].
As a consequence, there is a simple differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset of
n individuals and answers Ω˜(n) statistical queries in the adaptive model with error o(1/
√
n),
simply by perturbing each answer independently with carefully calibrated noise. In contrast,
the seminal lower bound of Dinur and Nissim and its later refinements [DN03, DY08] shows
that there exists a fixed set of O(n) queries that cannot be answered by any differentially private
algorithm with such little error, even in the easiest offline model. For an even more surprising
example, the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10] can in
many cases answer an exponential number of arbitrary, adaptively-chosen statistical queries
with a strong accuracy guarantee, whereas [BUV14] show that the accuracy guarantee of private
multiplicative weights is nearly optimal even for a simple, fixed family of queries.
These examples might give the impression that answering adaptively-chosen queries comes
“for free” in differential privacy—that everything that can be achieved in the offline model
can be matched in the adaptive model. Beyond just the lack of any separation between the
models, many of the most powerful differentially private algorithms in all of these models use
techniques from no-regret learning, which are explicitly designed for adaptive models.
Another motivation for studying the relationship between these models is the recent line
of work connecting differential privacy to statistical validity for adaptive data analysis [HU14,
1Usually, the “interactive model” refers only to what we call the “adaptive model.” We prefer to call all of these
models interactive, since they each require an interaction with a data analyst who issues the queries. We use the
term “interactive” to distinguish these models from one where the algorithm only answers a fixed set of queries.
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DFH+15, SU15b, BNS+16], which shows that differentially private algorithms for adaptively-
chosen queries in fact yield state-of-the-art algorithms for statistical problems unrelated to
privacy. This connection further motivates studying the adaptive model and its relationship to
the other models in differential privacy.
In this work, we show for the first time that these three models are actually distinct. In
fact, we show exponential separations between each of the three models. These are the first
separations between these models in differential privacy.
1.1 Our Results
Given a dataset x whose elements come from a data universe X, a statistical query on X is defined
by a predicate φ on X and asks “what fraction of elements in the dataset satisfy φ?” The
answer to a statistical query lies in [0,1] and our goal is to answer these queries up to some
small additive error ±α, for a suitable choice of 0 < α < 1. If the mechanism is required to
answer arbitrary statistical queries, then the offline, online, and adaptive models are essentially
equivalent — the upper bounds in the adaptive model match the lower bounds in the offline
model [DRV10, HR10, BUV14, SU15a]. However, we show that when the predicate φ is required
to take a specific form, then it becomes strictly easier to answer a set of these queries in the
offline model than it is to answer a sequence of queries presented online.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There exists a data universe X and a family of statistical queries Q on X
such that for every n ∈N,
1. there is a differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset x ∈ Xn and answers any set of
k = 2Ω(
√
n) offline queries from Q up to error ±1/100 from Q, but
2. no differentially private algorithm can take a dataset x ∈ Xn and answer an arbitrary sequence
of k =O(n2) online (but not adaptively-chosen) queries from Q up to error ±1/100.
This result establishes that the online model is strictly harder than the offline model. We
also demonstrate that the adaptive model is strictly harder than the online model. Here, the
family of queries we use in our separation is not a family of statistical queries, but is rather a
family of search queries with a specific definition of accuracy that we will define later.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For every n ∈N, there is a family of “search” queries Q on datasets in Xn
such that
1. there is a differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset x ∈ {±1}n and accurately answers
any online (but not adaptively-chosen) sequence of k = 2Ω(n) queries from Q, but
2. no differentially private algorithm can take a dataset x ∈ {±1}n and accurately answer an
adaptively-chosen sequence of k =O(1) queries from Q.
We leave it as an interesting open question to separate the online and adaptive models for
statistical queries, or to show that the models are equivalent for statistical queries.
Although Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 separate the three models, these results use somewhat
contrived families of queries. Thus, we also investigate whether the models are distinct for
natural families of queries that are of use in practical applications. One very well studied class
of queries is threshold queries. These are a family of statistical queries Qthresh defined on the
universe [0,1] and each query is specified by a point τ ∈ [0,1] and asks “what fraction of the
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elements of the dataset are at most τ?” If we restrict our attention to so-called pure differential
privacy (i.e. (ε,δ)-differential privacy with δ = 0), then we obtain an exponential separation
between the offline and online models for answering threshold queries.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). For every n ∈N,
1. there is a pure differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset x ∈ [0,1]n and answers any
set of k = 2Ω(n) offline queries from Qthresh up to error ±1/100, but
2. no pure differentially private algorithm takes a dataset x ∈ [0,1]n and answers an arbitrary
sequence of k =O(n) online (but not adaptively-chosen) queries from Qthresh up to error ±1/100.
We also ask whether or not such a separation exists for arbitrary differentially private algo-
rithms (i.e. (ε,δ)-differential privacy with δ > 0). Theorem 1.3 shows that, for pure differential
privacy, threshold queries have near-maximal sample complexity. That is, up to constants, the
lower bound for online threshold queries matches what is achieved by the Laplace mechanism,
which is applicable to arbitrary statistical queries. This may lead one to conjecture that adap-
tive threshold queries also require near-maximal sample complexity subject to approximate
differential privacy. However, we show that this is not the case:
Theorem 1.4. For every n ∈N, there is a differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset x ∈ [0,1]n
and answers any set of k = 2Ω(n) adaptively-chosen queries from Qthresh up to error ±1/100.
In contrast, for any offline set of k thresholds τ1, . . . , τk, we can round each element of the
dataset up to an element in the finite universe X = {τ1, . . . , τk ,1} without changing the answers to
any of the queries. Then we can use known algorithms for answering all threshold queries over
any finite, totally ordered domain [BNS13, BNSV15] to answer the queries using a very small
dataset of size n = 2O(log
∗(k)). We leave it as an interesting open question to settle the complexity
of answering adaptively-chosen threshold queries in the adaptive model.
1.2 Techniques
Separating Offline and Online Queries
To prove Theorem 1.1, we construct a sequence of queries q1, · · · ,qk such that, for all j ∈ [k],
• qj “reveals” the answers to q1, · · · ,qj−1, but
• q1, · · · ,qj−1 do not reveal the answer to qj .
Thus, given the sequence q1, · · · ,qk in the offline setting, the answers to q1, · · · ,qk−1 are revealed
by qk. So only qk needs to be answered and the remaining query answers can be inferred.
However, in the online setting, each query qj−1 must be answered before qj is presented and this
approach does not work. This is the intuition for our separation.
To prove the online lower bound, we build on a lower bound for marginal queries [BUV14],
which is based on the existence of short secure fingerprinting codes [BS98, Tar08]. Consider the
data universe {±1}k . Given a dataset x ∈ {±1}n×k , a marginal query is a specific type of statistical
query that asks for the mean of a given column of x. Bun et al. [BUV14] showed that unless
k  n2, there is no differentially private algorithm that answers all k marginal queries with
non-trivial accuracy. This was done by showing that such an algorithm would violate the
security of a short fingerprinting code due to Tardos [Tar08]. We are able to “embed” k marginal
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queries into the sequence of online queries q1, · · · ,qk. Thus a modification of the lower bound
for marginal queries applies in the online setting.
To prove the offline upper bound, we use the fact that every query reveals information
about other queries. However, we must handle arbitrary sequences of queries, not just the
specially-constructed sequences used for the lower bound. The key property of our family of
queries is the following. Each element x of the data universe X requires k bits to specify. On the
other hand, for any set of queries q1, · · · ,qk , we can specify q1(x), · · · ,qk(x) using only O(log(nk))
bits. Thus the effective size of the data universe given the queries is poly(nk), rather than 2k.
Then we can apply a differentially private algorithm that gives good accuracy as long as the
data universe has subexponential size [BLR13]. Reducing the size of the data universe is only
possible once the queries have been specified; hence this approach only works in the offline
setting.
Separating Online and Adaptive Queries
To prove Theorem 1.2, we start with the classical randomized response algorithm [War65].
Specifically, given a dataset x ∈ {±1}n, randomized response produces a new dataset y ∈ {±1}n
where each coordinate yi is independently set to +xi with probability (1 +α)/2 and is set to −xi
with probability (1−α)/2. It is easy to prove that this algorithm is (O(α),0)-differentially private.
What accuracy guarantee does this algorithm satisfy? By design, it outputs a vector y that has
correlation approximately α with the dataset x — that is, 〈y,x〉 ≈ αn. On the other hand, it is
also easy to prove that there is no differentially private algorithm (for any reasonable privacy
parameters) that can output a vector that has correlation at least 1/2 with the sensitive dataset.
Our separation between the online and adaptive models is based on the observation that,
if we can obtain O(1/α2) “independent” vectors y1, . . . , yk that are each roughly α-correlated
with x, then we can obtain a vector z that is (1/2)-correlated with x, simply by letting z be the
coordinate-wise majority of the yjs. Thus, no differentially private algorithm can output such a
set of vectors. More precisely, we require that 〈yi , yj〉 ≈ α2n for i , j, which is achieved if each yj
is an independent sample from randomized response.
Based on this observation, we devise a class of queries such that, if we are allowed to choose
k of these queries adaptively, then we obtain a set of vectors y1, . . . , yk satisfying the conditions
above. This rules out differential privacy for k = O(1/α2) adaptive queries. The key is that
we can use adaptivity to ensure that each query asks for an “independent” yj by adding the
previous answers y1, · · · , yj−1 as constraints in the search query.
On the other hand, randomized response can answer each such query with high probability.
If a number of these queries is fixed in advance, then, by a union bound, the vector y output by
randomized response is simultaneously an accurate answer to every query with high probability.
Since randomized response is oblivious to the queries, we can also answer the queries in the
online model, as long as they are not chosen adaptively.
At a high level, the queries that achieve this property are of the form “output a vector
y ∈ {±1}n that is approximately α-correlated with x and is approximately as uncorrelated as
possible with the vectors v1, . . . , vm.” A standard concentration argument shows that randomized
response gives an accurate answer to all the queries simulatneously with high probability. On
the other hand, if we are allowed to choose the queries adaptively, then for each query qi , we can
ask for a vector yi that is correlated with x but is as uncorrelated as possible with the previous
answers y1, . . . , yi−1.
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Threshold Queries
For pure differential privacy, our separation between offline and online threshold queries uses
a simple argument based on binary search. Our starting point is a lower bound showing
that any purely differentially private algorithm that takes a dataset of n points x1, . . . ,xn ∈
{1, . . . ,T } and outputs an approximate median of these points requires n = Ω(log(T )). This
lower bound follows from a standard application of the “packing” technique of Hardt and
Talwar [HT10]. On the other hand, by using binary search, any algorithm that can answer
k =O(log(T )) adaptively-chosen threshold queries can be used to find an approximate median.
Thus, any purely differentially private algorithm for answering such queries requires a dataset
of size n = Ω(k). Using the structure of the lower bound argument, we show that the same
lower bound holds for online non-adaptive queries as well. In contrast, using the algorithms
of [DNPR10, CSS11, DNRR15], we can answer k offline threshold queries on a dataset with only
n =O(log(k)) elements, giving an exponential separation.
The basis of our improved algorithm for adaptive threshold queries under approximate
differential privacy is a generalization of the sparse vector technique [DNPR10, RR10, HR10]
(see [DR14, §3.6] for a textbook treatment). Our algorithm makes crucial use of a stability
argument similar to the propose-test-release techniques of Dwork and Lei [DL09]. To our
knowledge, this is the first use of a stabiltiy argument for any online or adaptive problem in
differential privacy and may be of independent interest. In particular, our algorithm is given an
input x ∈ Xn, a threshold t ∈ (0,1), and an adaptive sequence of statistical (or low-sensitivity)
queries q1, · · · ,qk : Xn→ [0,1] and, for each query qj , it reports (i) qj(x) ≥ t, (ii) qj(x) ≤ t, or (iii)
t −α ≤ qj(x) ≤ t +α. The sample complexity of this algorithm is n =O(
√
c log(k/εδ)/εα), where k
is the total number of queries, c is an upper bound on the number of times (iii) may be reported,
and (ε,δ)-differential privacy is provided. We call this the Between Thresholds algorithm.
Once we have this algorithm, we can use it to answer adaptively-chosen thresholds using
an approach inspired by Bun et al. [BNSV15]. The high-level ideal is to sort the dataset
x(1) < x(2) < · · · < x(n) and then partition it into chunks of consecutive sorted elements. For
any chunk, and a threshold τ , we can use the between thresholds algorithm to determine
(approximately) whether τ lies below all elements in the chunk, above all elements in the chunk,
or inside the chunk. Obtaining this information for every chunk is enough to accurately estimate
the answer to the threshold query τ up to an error proportional to the size of the chunks. The
sample complexity is dominated by the O(logk) sample complexity of our Between Thresholds
algorithm multiplied by the number of chunks needed, namely O(1/α).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Datasets and Differential Privacy
A dataset x ∈ (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Xn is an ordered tuple of n elements from some data universe X. We
say that two datasets x,x′ are adjacent if they differ on only a single element and denote this
relation by x ∼ x′.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). A randomized algorithm M : Xn→R is (ε,δ)-
differentially private if for every two adjacent datasets x ∼ x′, and every R ⊆R,
P [M(x) ∈ R] ≤ eεP[M(x′) ∈ R]+ δ.
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We also use the following well known group privacy property of (ε,0)-differential privacy.
We say that two datasets x,x′ are c-adjacent if the differ on at most c-elements, and denote this
relation by x ∼c x′.
Lemma 2.2 ([DMNS06]). If M : Xn →R is (ε,0)-differentially private, then for every c ∈N and
every two c-adjacent datasets x ∼c x′, and every R ⊆R,
P [M(x) ∈ R] ≤ ecεP[M(x′) ∈ R] .
2.2 Queries
In this work we consider two general classes of queries on the dataset: statistical queries, and
search queries. Although statistical queries are a very special case of search queries, we will
present each of them independently to avoid having to use overly abstract notation to describe
statistical queries.
Statistical Queries. A statistical query on a data universe X is defined by a Boolean predicate
q : X→ {0,1}. Abusing notation, we define the evaluation of a statistical query q on a dataset
x = (x1, . . . ,xn) to be the average of the predicate over the rows
q(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q(xi) ∈ [0,1].
For a dataset x, a statistical query q, and an answer a ∈ [0,1], the answer is α-accurate for q on x if
|q(x)− a| ≤ α.
Search Queries. A search query q on Xn is defined by a loss function Lq : Xn×R→ [0,∞), where
R is an arbitrary set representing the range of possible outputs. For a dataset x ∈ Xn and an
output y ∈ R, we will say that y is α-accurate for q on x if Lq(x,y) ≤ α. In some cases the value of
Lq will always be either 0 or 1. Thus we simply say that y is accurate for q on x if Lq(x,y) = 0. For
example, if Xn = {±1}n, we can define a search query by R = {±1}n, and Lq(x,y) = 0 if 〈x,y〉 ≥ αn
and Lq(x,y) = 1 otherwise. In this case, the search query would ask for any vector y that has
correlation α with the dataset.
To see that statistical queries are a special case of search queries, given a statistical query
q on Xn, we can define a search query Lq with R = [0,1] and Lq(x,a) = |q(x) − a|. Then both
definitions of α-accurate align.
2.3 Models of Interactive Queries
The goal of this work is to understand the implications of different ways to allow an adversary
to query a sensitive dataset. In each of these models there is an algorithm M that holds a dataset
x ∈ Xn, and a fixed family of (statistical or search) queriesQ on Xn, and a bound k on the number
of queries that M has to answer. There is also an adversary A that chooses the queries. The
models differ in how the queries chosen by A are given to M.
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Offline
In the offline model, the queries q1, . . . , qk ∈Q are specified by the adversary A in advance and
the algorithm M is given all the queries at once and must provide answers. Formally, we define
the following function OfflineA→←M : X
n→Qk ×Rk depending A and M.
Input: x ∈ Xn.
A chooses q1, · · · ,qk ∈Q.
M is given x and q1, · · · ,qk and outputs a1, · · · , ak ∈ R.
Output: (q1, · · · ,qk , a1, · · · , ak) ∈Qk ×Rk .
Figure 1: OfflineA→←M : X
n→Qk ×Rk
Online Non-Adaptive
In the online non-adaptive model, the queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q are again fixed in advance by the
adversary, but are then given to the algorithm one at a time, and the algorithm must give an
answer to query qj before it is shown qj+1. We define a function OnlineA→←M : X
n → Qk ×Rk
depending on the adversary A and the algorithm M as follows.
Input: x ∈ Xn.
A chooses q1, · · · ,qk ∈Q.
M is given x.
For j = 1, . . . , k:
M is given qj and outputs aj ∈ R.2
Output: (q1, · · · ,qk , a1, · · · , ak) ∈Qk ×Rk .
Figure 2: OnlineA→←M : X
n→Qk ×Rk
Online Adaptive
In the online adaptive model, the queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q are not fixed, and the adversary may
choose each qj based on the answers that the algorithm gave to the previous queries. We define
a function AdaptiveA→←M : X
n→Qk ×Rk depending on the adversary A and the algorithm M as
follows.
Definition 2.3 (Differential Privacy for Interactive Mechanisms). In each of the three cases
— Offline, Online Non-Adaptive, or Online Adaptive — we say that M is (ε,δ)-differentially
private if, for all adversaries A, respectively OfflineA→←M , OnlineA
→
←M , or AdaptiveA→←M is (ε,δ)-
differentially private.
Definition 2.4 (Accuracy for Interactive Mechanisms). In each case — Offline, Online Non-
Adaptive, or Online Adaptive queries — we say that M is (α,β)-accurate if, for all adversaries A
and all inputs x ∈ Xn,
P
q1,··· ,qk ,a1,··· ,ak
[
max
j∈[k]
Lqj (x,aj ) ≤ α
]
≥ 1− β, (1)
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Input: x ∈ Xn.
M is given x.
For j = 1, . . . , k:
A chooses a query qj ∈Q.
M is given qj and outputs aj ∈ R.
Output: (q1, · · · ,qk , a1, · · · , ak) ∈Qk ×Rk .
Figure 3: AdaptiveA→←M : X
n→Qk ×Rk
where (q1, · · · ,qk , a1, · · · , ak) is respectively drawn from one of OfflineA→←M(x), OnlineA→←M(x), or
AdaptiveA→←M(x). We also say that M is α-accurate if the above holds with (1) replaced by
E
q1,··· ,qk ,a1,··· ,ak
[
max
j∈[k]
Lqj (x,aj )
]
≤ α.
3 A Separation Between Offline and Online Queries
In this section we prove that online accuracy is strictly harder to achieve than offline accuracy,
even for statistical queries. We prove our results by constructing a set of statistical queries
that we call prefix queries for which it is possible to take a dataset of size n and accurately
answer superpolynomially many offline prefix queries in a differentially private manner, but
it is impossible to answer more than O(n2) online prefix queries while satisfying differential
privacy.
We now define the family of prefix queries. These queries are defined on the universe
X = {±1}∗ = ⋃∞j=0{±1}j consisting of all finite length binary strings.3 For x,y ∈ {±1}∗, we use y  x
to denote that y is a prefix of x. Formally
y  x ⇐⇒ |y| ≤ |x| and ∀i = 1, . . . , |y| xi = yi .
Definition 3.1. For any finite set S ⊆ {±1}∗ of finite-length binary strings, we define the prefix
query qS : {±1}∗→ {±1} by
qS(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈ S y  x.
We also define
Qprefix = {qS | S ⊂ {±1}∗}
QBprefix = {qS | S ⊂ {±1}∗, |S | ≤ B}
to be the set of all prefix queries and the set of prefix queries with sizes bounded by B, respec-
tively.
3All of the arguments in this section hold if we restrict to strings of length at most k + logn. However, we allow
strings of arbitrary length to reduce notational clutter.
8
3.1 Answering Offline Prefix Queries
We now prove that there is a differentially private algorithm that answers superpolynomially
many prefix queries, provided that the queries are specified offline.
Theorem 3.2 (Answering Offline Prefix Queries). For every α,ε ∈ (0,1/10), every B ∈N, and every
n ∈N, there exists a
k = min
{
2Ω(
√
α3εn),2Ω(α
3εn/ log(B))
}
and an (ε,0)-differentially private algorithm Mprefix : Xn × (QBprefix)k→Rk that is (α,1/100)-accurate
for k offline queries from QBprefix.
We remark that it is possible to answer even more offline prefix queries by relaxing to
(ε,δ)-differential privacy for some negligibly small δ > 0. However, we chose to state the results
for (ε,0)-differential privacy to emphasize the contrast with the lower bound, which applies
even when δ > 0, and to simplify the statement.
Our algorithm for answering offline queries relies on the existence of a good differentially pri-
vate algorithm for answering arbitrary offline statistical queries. For concreteness, the so-called
“BLR mechanism” of Blum, Ligett, and Roth [BLR13] suffices, although different parameter
tradeoffs can be obtained using different mechanisms. Differentially private algorithms with
this type of guarantee exist only when the data universe is bounded, which is not the case for
prefix queries. However, as we show, when the queries are specified offline, we can replace the
infinite universe X = {±1}∗ with a finite, restricted universe X ′ and run the BLR mechanism.
Looking ahead, the key to our separation will be the fact that this universe restriction is only
possible in the offline setting. Before we proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.2, we will state
the guarantees of the BLR mechanism.
Theorem 3.3 ([BLR13]). For every 0 < α,ε ≤ 1/10 and every finite data universe X, if QSQ is the set
of all statistical queries on X, then for every n ∈N, there is a
k = 2Ω(α
3εn/ log |X |)
and an (ε,0)-differentially private algorithm MBLR : Xn ×QkSQ→Rk that is (α,1/100)-accurate for k
offline queries from QSQ.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Suppose we are given a set of queries qS1 , . . . , qSk ∈ QBprefix and a dataset
x ∈ Xn where X = {±1}∗. Let S = ⋃kj=1Sj . We define the universe XS = S ∪ {∅} where ∅ denotes
the empty string of length 0. Note that this universe depends on the choice of queries, and that
|XS | ≤ kB+ 1. Since XS ⊂ X, it will be well defined to restrict the domain of each query qSj to
elements of XS .
Next, given a dataset x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Xn, and a collection of sets S1, . . . ,Sk ⊂ X, we give
a procedure for mapping each element of x to an element of XS to obtain a new dataset
xS = (xS1 , . . . ,x
S
n ) ∈ XnS that is equivalent to x with respect to the queries qS1 , . . . , qSk . Specifically,
define rS : X→ XS by
rS(x) = argmax
y∈XS ,yx
|y|.
That is, rS(x) is the longest string in XS that is a prefix of x. We summarize the key property of
rS in the following claim
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Claim 3.4. For every x ∈ X, and j = 1, . . . , k, qSj (rS(x)) = qSj (x).
Proof of Claim 3.4. First, we state a simple but important fact about prefixes: If y,y′ are both
prefixes of a string x with |y| ≤ |y′ |, then y is a prefix of y′. Formally,
∀x,y,y′ ∈ {0,1}∗ (y  x ∧ y′  x ∧ |y| ≤ |y′ |) =⇒ y  y′ . (2)
Now, fix any x ∈ X and any query qSj and suppose that qSj (x) = 1. Then there exists a string
y ∈ Sj such that y  x. By construction, we have that rS(x)  x and that |rS(x)| ≥ |y|. Thus, by (2),
we have that y  rS(x). Thus, there exists y ∈ Sj such that y  rS(x), which means qSj (rS(x)) = 1,
as required.
Next, suppose that qSj (rS(x)) = 1. Then, there exists y ∈ Sj such that y  rS(x). By construc-
tion, rS(x)  x, so by transitivity we have that y  x. Therefore, qSj (x) = 1, as required.
Given this lemma, we can replace every row xi of x with x
S
i = rS(xi) to obtain a new dataset
xS such that for every j = 1, . . . , k,
qSj (x
S ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
qSj (x
S
i ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
qSj (xi) = qSj (x).
Thus, we can answer qS1 , · · · ,qSk on xS ∈ XnS , rather than on x ∈ Xn. Note that each row of xS
depends only on the corresponding row of x. Hence, for every set of queries qS1 , . . . , qSk , if
x ∼ x′ are adjacent datasets, then xS ∼ x′S are also adjacent datasets. Consequently, applying
a (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm to xS yields a (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm as a
function of x.
In particular, we can give α-accurate answers to these queries using the algorithm MBLR as
long as
k ≤ 2Ω(α3εn/ log |XS |) = 2Ω(α3εn/ log(kB+1)).
Rearranging terms gives the bound in Theorem 3.2. We specify the complete algorithm Mprefix
in Figure 4.
Mprefix(x;qS1 , . . . , qSk ):
Write x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Xn, S = ⋃kj=1Sj , XS = S ∪ {∅}.
For i = 1, . . . ,n, let xSi = rS(xi) and let x
S = (xS1 , . . . ,x
S
n ) ∈ XnS .
Let (a1, . . . , ak) =MBLR(xS ;qS1 , . . . , qSk ).
Output (a1, . . . , ak).
Figure 4: Mprefix
3.2 A Lower Bound for Online Prefix Queries
Next, we prove a lower bound for online queries. Our lower bound shows that the simple
approach of perturbing the answer to each query with independent noise is essentially optimal
for prefix queries. Since this approach is only able to answer k = O(n2) queries, we obtain
an exponential separation between online and offline statistical queries for a broad range of
parameters.
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Theorem 3.5 (Lower Bound for Online Prefix Queries). There exists a function k = O(n2) such
that for every sufficiently large n ∈N, there is no (1,1/30n)-differentially private algorithm M that
takes a dataset x ∈ Xn and is (1/100,1/100)-accurate for k online queries from Qnprefix.
In this parameter regime, our algorithm from Section 3.1 answers k = exp(Ω˜(
√
n)) offline
prefix queries, so we obtain an exponential separation.
Our lower bound relies on a connection between fingerprinting codes and differential privacy
[Ull13, BUV14, SU15a, DSS+15]. However, instead of using fingerprinting codes in a black-box
way, we will make a direct use of the main techniques. Specifically, we will rely heavily on the
following key lemma. The proof appears in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.6 (Fingerprinting Lemma). Let f : {±1}n→ [−1,1] be any function. Suppose p is sampled
from the uniform distribution over [−1,1] and c ∈ {±1}n is a vector of n independent bits, where each
bit has expectation p. Letting c denote the coordinate-wise mean of c, we have
E
p,c
f (c) ·∑
i∈[n]
(ci − p) + 2
∣∣∣f (c)− c ∣∣∣ ≥ 13 .
Roughly the fingerprinting lemma says that if we sample a vector c ∈ {±1}n in a specific
fashion, then for any bounded function f (c), we either have that f (c) has “significant” correlation
with ci for some coordinate i, or that f (c) is “far” from c on average. In our lower bound, the
vector c will represent a column of the dataset, so each coordinate ci will correspond to the value
of some row of the dataset. The function f (c) will represent the answer to some prefix query. We
will use the accuracy of a mechanism for answering prefix queries to argue that f (c) is not far
from c, and therefore conclude that f (c) must be significantly correlated with some coordinate
ci . On the other hand, if ci were excluded from the dataset, then ci is sufficiently random that
the mechanism’s answers cannot be significantly correlated with ci . We will use this to derive a
contradiction to differential privacy.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. First we define the distribution on the input dataset x = (x1, . . . ,xn) and
the queries qS1 , · · · ,qSk .
Input dataset x:
• Sample p1, · · · ,pk ∈ [−1,1] independently and uniformly at random.
• Sample c1, · · · , ck ∈ {±1}n independently, where each cj is a vector of n independent bits,
each with expectation pj .
• For i ∈ [n], define
xi = (binary(i), c
1
i , · · · , cki ) ∈ {±1}dlog2 ne+k ,
where binary(i) ∈ {±1}dlog2 ne is the binary representation of i where 1 is mapped to +1 and
0 is mapped to −1.4 Let x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈
(
{±1}dlog2 ne+k
)n
.
4This choice is arbitrary, and is immaterial to our lower bound. The only property we need is that binary(i)
uniquely identifies i and, for notational consistency, we require binary(i) to be a string over the alphabet {±1}.
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Queries qS1 , · · · ,qSk :
• For i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k], define
zi,j = (binary(i), c
1
i , · · · , cj−1i ,1) ∈ {±1}dlog2 ne+j .
• For j ∈ [k], define qSj ∈Qnprefix by Sj =
{
zi,j | i ∈ [n]
}
.
These queries are designed so that the correct answer to each query j ∈ [k] is given by
qSj (x) = c
j :
Claim 3.7. For every j ∈ [k], if the dataset x and the queries qS1 , . . . , qSk are constructed as above, then
with probability 1,
qSj (x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
qSj (xi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
c
j
i = c
j
Proof of Claim 3.7. We have
qSj (xi) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ Sj (w  xi) ⇐⇒ ∃` ∈ [n] (z`,j  xi).
By construction, we have z`,j  xi if and only if ` = i and xji = cji = 1, as required. Here, we have
used the fact that the strings binary(i) are unique to ensure that z`,j  xi if and only if ` = i.
We now show no differentially private algorithm M is capable of giving accurate answers to
these queries. Let M be an algorithm that answers k online queries from Qnprefix. Suppose we
generate an input dataset x and queries qS1 , . . . , qSk as above, and run M(x) on this sequence of
queries. Let a1, . . . , ak ∈ [−1,1] denote the answers given by M.
First, we claim that, if M(x) is accurate for the given queries, then each answer aj is close to
the corresponding value cj = 1n
∑n
i=1 c
j
i .
Claim 3.8. If M is (1/100,1/100)-accurate for k online queries from Qnprefix, then with probability 1
over the choice of x and qS1 , . . . , qSk above,
E
M
∑
j∈[k]
∣∣∣aj − cj ∣∣∣ ≤ k10 .
Proof of Claim 3.8. By Claim 3.7, for every j ∈ [k], qSj (x) = cj . Since, by assumption, M is
(1/100,1/100)-accurate for k online queries from Qnprefix, we have that with probability at least
99/100,
∀j ∈ [k]
∣∣∣∣aj − qSj (x)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1100 =⇒ ∀j ∈ [k] ∣∣∣aj − cj ∣∣∣ ≤ 1100
By linearity of expectation, this case contributes at most k/100 to the expectation. On the other
hand, |aj − qSj (x)| ≤ 2, so by linearity of expectation the case where M is inaccurate contributes
at most 2k/100 to the expectation. This suffices to prove the claim.
The next claim shows how the fingerprinting lemma (Lemma 3.6) can be applied to M.
12
Claim 3.9.
E
p,x,q,M
∑
j∈[k]
aj ∑
i∈[n]
(cji − pj ) + 2
∣∣∣aj − cj ∣∣∣
 ≥ k3 .
Proof. By linearity of expectation, it suffices to show that, for every j ∈ [k],
E
p,x,q,M
aj ∑
i∈[n]
(cji − pj ) + 2
∣∣∣aj − cj ∣∣∣ ≥ 13 .
Since each column cj is generated independently from the columns c1, . . . , cj−1, cj and pj are
independent from qS1 , · · · ,qSj . Thus, at the time M produces the output aj , it does not have any
information about cj or pj apart from its private input. (Although M later learns cj when it is
asked qSj+1 .) For any fixed values of c
1, . . . , cj−1 and the internal randomness of M, the answer aj
is a deterministic function of cj . Thus we can apply Lemma 3.6 to this function to establish the
claim.
Combining Claims 3.8 and 3.9 gives
E
p,x,q,M
∑
j∈[k]
aj
∑
i∈[n]
(cji − pj )
 ≥ 2k15 .
In particular, there exists some i∗ ∈ [n] such that
E
p,x,q,M
∑
j∈[k]
aj(cji∗ − pj )
 ≥ 2k15n. (3)
To complete the proof, we show that (3) violates the differential privacy guarantee unless
n ≥Ω(√k).
To this end, fix any p1, . . . ,pk ∈ [−1,1], whence c1i∗ , · · · , cki∗ ∈ {±1} are independent bits with
E
[
cj
]
= pj . Let c˜1, · · · , c˜k ∈ {±1} be independent bits with E
[
c˜j
]
= pj . The random variables
c1i∗ , · · · , cki∗ have the same marginal distribution as c˜1, · · · , c˜k . However, c˜1, · · · , c˜k are independent
from a1, · · · , ak , whereas a1, · · · , ak depend on c1i∗ , · · · , cki∗ . Consider the quantities
Z =
∑
j∈[k]
aj(cji∗ − pj ) and Z˜ =
∑
j∈[k]
aj(c˜j − pj ).
Differential privacy implies that Z and Z˜ have similar distributions. Specifically, if M is
(1,1/30n)-differentially private, then
E [|Z |] =
∫ 2k
0
P [|Z | > z]dz ≤
∫ 2k
0
(
eP
[
|Z˜ | > z
]
+
1
30n
)
dz = eE
[
|Z˜ |
]
+
k
15n
,
as |Z |, |Z˜ | ≤ 2k with probability 1.
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Now E [|Z |] ≥ E [Z] ≥ 2k/15n, by (3). On the other hand, aj is independent from c˜j and
E
[
c˜j − pj
]
= 0, so E
[
Z˜
]
= 0. We now observe that
E
[
|Z˜ |
]2 ≤ E [Z˜2] = Var [Z˜] = ∑
j∈[k]
Var
[
aj(c˜j − pj )
]
≤
∑
j∈[k]
E
[
(c˜j − pj )2
]
≤ k.
Thus, we have
2k
15n
≤ E [|Z |] ≤ eE
[
|Z˜ |
]
+
k
15n
≤ e√k + k
15n
.
The condition 2k/15n ≤ e√k+k/15n is a contradiction unless k ≤ 225e2n2. Thus, we can conclude
that there exists a k =O(n2) such that no (1,1/30n)-differentially private algorithm is accurate
for more than k online queries from Qnprefix, as desired. This completes the proof.
4 A Separation Between Adaptive and Non-Adaptive Online Queries
In this section we prove that even among online queries, answering adaptively-chosen queries
can be strictly harder than answering non-adaptively-chosen queries. Our separation applies to
a family of search queries that we call correlated vector queries. We show that for a certain regime
of parameters, it is possible to take a dataset of size n and privately answer an exponential
number of fixed correlated vector queries, even if the queries are presented online, but it is
impossible to answer more than a constant number of adaptively-chosen correlated vector
queries under differential privacy.
The queries are defined on datasets x ∈ {±1}n (hence the data universe is X = {±1}). For
every query, the range R = {±1}n is the set of n-bit vectors. We fix some parameters 0 < α < 1
and m ∈ N. A query q is specified by a set V where V =
{
v1, . . . , vm
}
⊆ {±1}n is a set of n-bit
vectors. Roughly, an accurate answer to a given search query is any vector y ∈ {±1}n that is
approximately α-correlated with the input dataset x ∈ {±1}n and has nearly as little correlation
as possible with every vj . By “as little correlation as possible with vj” we mean that vj may itself
be correlated with x, in which case y should be correlated with vj only insofar as this correlation
comes through the correlation between y and x. Formally, for a query qV , we define the loss
function LqV : X
n ×Xn→ {0,1} by
LqV (x,y) = 0 ⇐⇒
∣∣∣〈y −αx,x〉∣∣∣ ≤ α2n
100
∧ ∀vj ∈ V ∣∣∣〈y −αx,vj〉∣∣∣ ≤ α2n
100
.
We remark that the choice of α2n/100 is somewhat arbitrary, and we can replace this choice with
C for any
√
n C n and obtain quantitatively different results. We chose to fix this particular
choice in order to reduce notational clutter. We let
Qn,α,mcorr = {qV | V ⊆ {±1}n, |V | ≤m}
be the set of all correlated vector queries on {±1}n for parameters α,m.
4.1 Answering Online Correlated Vector Queries
Provided that all the queries are fixed in advance, we can privately answer correlated vector
queries using the randomized response algorithm. This algorithm simply takes the input vector
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x ∈ {±1}n and outputs a new vector y ∈ {±1}n where each bit yi is independent and is set to xi
with probability 1/2 + ρ for a suitable choice of ρ > 0. The algorithm will then answer every
correlated vector query with this same vector y. The following theorem captures the parameters
that this mechanism achieves.
Theorem 4.1 (Answering Online Correlated Vector Queries). For every 0 < α < 1/2, there exists
k = 2Ω(α
4n) such that, for every sufficiently large n ∈ N, there is a (3α,0)-differentially private
algorithm Mcorr that takes a dataset x ∈ {±1}n and is (1/k)-accurate for k online queries from Qn,α,kcorr .
Proof Theorem 4.1. Our algorithm based on randomized response is presented in Figure 5 below.
Mcorr:
Input: a dataset x ∈ {±1}n.
Parameters: 0 < α < 1/2.
For i = 1, . . . ,n, independently set
yi =
+xi with probability 1+α2−xi with probability 1−α2 .
Let y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {±1}n, and answer each query with y.
Figure 5: Mcorr
To establish privacy, observe that by construction each output bit yi depends only on xi and
is independent of all xj , yj for j , i. Therefore, it suffices to observe that if 0 < α < 1/2,
1 ≤ P[yi = +1 | xi = +1]
P[yi = +1 | xi = −1] =
1 +α
1−α ≤ e
3α
and similarly
1 ≥ P[yi = −1 | xi = +1]
P[yi = −1 | xi = −1] =
1−α
1 +α
≥ e−3α .
To prove accuracy, observe that since the output y does not depend on the sequence of
queries, we can analyze the mechanism as if the queries qV1 , . . . , qVk ∈Qn,α,kcorr were fixed and given
all at once. Let V =
⋃k
j=1Vj , and note that |V | ≤ k2. First, observe that E [y] = αx. Thus we have
E
y
[〈y −αx,x〉] = 0 and ∀v ∈ V E
y
[〈y −αx,v〉] = 0
Since x and every vector in V is fixed independently of y, and the coordinates of y are inde-
pendent by construction, the quantities 〈y,x〉 and 〈y,v〉 are each the sum of n independent
{±1}-valued random variables. Thus, we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality5 and a union bound
5We use the following statement of Hoeffding’s Inequality: if Z1, . . . ,Zn are independent {±1}-valued random
variables, and Z =
∑n
i=1Zi , then
P
[∣∣∣∣ Z −E [Z] ∣∣∣∣ > C√n] ≤ 2e−C2/2
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to conclude
P
y
[
|〈y −αx,x〉| > α
2n
100
]
≤ 2exp
( −α4n
20000
)
P
y
[
∃v ∈ V s.t. |〈y −αx,v〉| > α
2n
100
]
≤ 2k2 exp
( −α4n
20000
)
The theorem now follows by setting an appropriate choice of k = 2Ω(α
4n) such that 2(k2 + 1) ·
exp
( −α4n
20000
)
≤ 1/k.
4.2 A Lower Bound for Adaptive Correlated Vector Queries
We now prove a contrasting lower bound showing that if the queries may be chosen adaptively,
then no differentially private algorithm can answer more than a constant number of correlated
vector queries. The key to our lower bound is that fact that adaptively-chosen correlated
vector queries allow an adversary to obtain many vectors y1, . . . , yk that are correlated with x
but pairwise nearly orthogonal with each other. As we prove, if k is sufficiently large, this
information is enough to recover a vector x˜ that has much larger correlation with x than any
of the vectors y1, . . . , yk have with x. By setting the parameters appropriately, we will obtain a
contradiction to differential privacy.
Theorem 4.2 (Lower Bound for Correlated Vector Queries). For every 0 < α < 1/2, there is a
k = O(1/α2) such that for every sufficiently large n ∈N, there is no (1,1/20)-differentially private
algorithm that takes a dataset x ∈ {±1}n and is 1/100-accurate for k adaptive queries from Qn,α,kcorr
We remark that the value of k in our lower bound is optimal up to constants, as there
is a (1,1/20)-differentially private algorithm that can answer k = Ω(1/α2) adaptively-chosen
queries of this sort. The algorithm simply answers each query with an independent invocation
of randomized response. Randomized response is O(α)-differentially private for each query,
and we can invoke the adaptive composition theorem [DMNS06, DRV10] to argue differential
privacy for k =Ω(1/α2)-queries.
Before proving Theorem 4.2, we state and prove the combinatorial lemma that forms the
foundation of our lower bound.
Lemma 4.3 (Reconstruction Lemma). Fix parameters 0 ≤ a,b ≤ 1. Let x ∈ {±1}n and y1, · · · , yk ∈
{±1}n be vectors such that
∀1 ≤ j ≤ k 〈yj ,x〉 ≥ an
∀1 ≤ j < j ′ ≤ k |〈yj , yj ′〉| ≤ bn.
Then, if we let x˜ = sign(
∑k
j=1 y
j ) ∈ {±1}n be the coordinate-wise majority of y1, . . . , yk , we have
〈x˜,x〉 ≥
(
1− 2
a2k
− 2(b − a
2)
a2
)
n.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Let
y =
1
k
k∑
j=1
yj ∈ [−1,1]n.
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By linearity, 〈y,x〉 ≥ an and
‖y‖22 =
1
k2
k∑
j,j ′=1
〈yj , yj ′〉 ≤ 1
k2
(
kn+ (k2 − k)bn
)
≤
(1
k
+ b
)
n.
Define a random variable W ∈ [−1,1] to be xiyi for a uniformly random i ∈ [n]. Then
E [W ] =
1
n
〈x,y〉 ≥ a and E
[
W 2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
x2i y
2
i =
1
n
‖y‖22 ≤
1
k
+ b
By Chebyshev’s inequality,
P [W ≤ 0] ≤ P
[
|W −E [W ] | ≥ a
]
≤ Var[W ]
a2
=
E[W 2]−E[W ]2
a2
≤
1
k + b − a2
a2
.
Meanwhile,
P [W ≤ 0] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
I[xiyi ≤ 0] ≥
1
n
n∑
i=1
I[sign(yi) , xi] =
1
2
− 1
2n
〈sign(y),x〉.
Thus we conclude
〈sign(y),x〉 ≥ n− 2nP [W ≤ 0] ≥ n− 2n
 1k + b − a2a2

To complete the proof, we rearrange terms and note that sign(y) = sign(
∑k
j=1 y
j ).
Now we are ready to prove our lower bound for algorithms that answer adaptively-chosen
correlated vector queries.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We will show that the output y1, . . . , yk of any algorithm M that takes a
dataset x ∈ {±1}n and answers k = 100/α2 adaptively-chosen correlated vector queries can be
used to find a vector x˜ ∈ {±1}n such that 〈x˜,x〉 > n/2. In light of Lemma 4.3, this vector will
simply be x˜ = sign(
∑k
j=1 y
j ). We will then invoke the following elementary fact that differentially
private algorithms do not admit this sort of reconstruction of their input dataset.
Fact 4.4. For every sufficiently large n ∈ N, there is no (1,1/20)-differentially private algorithm
M : {±1}n→ {±1}n such that for every x ∈ {±1}n, with probability at least 99/100, 〈M(x),x〉 > n/2.
The attack works as follows. For j = 1, . . . , k, define the set Vj =
{
y1, . . . , yj−1
}
and ask the query
qVj (x) ∈ Qn,α,kcorr to obtain some vector yj . Since M is assumed to be accurate for k adaptively-
chosen queries, with probability 99/100, we obtain vectors y1, . . . , yk ∈ {±1}n such that
∀1 ≤ j ≤ k 〈yj ,x〉 ≥ 〈αx,x〉 − |〈y −αx,x〉|
≥ αn− α
2n
100
≥ an,
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∀1 ≤ j < j ′ ≤ k |〈yj , yj ′〉| ≤ |〈αx,yj〉|+ |〈yj ′ −αx,yj〉|
≤ α|〈yj ,x〉|+ α
2n
100
≤ α
(
|〈αx,x〉|+ |〈yj −αx,x〉|
)
+
α2n
100
≤ α2n+ α
3n
100
+
α2n
100
≤ 51
50
α2n
= bn,
where a = 99α/100 and b = 51α2/50. Thus, by Lemma 4.3, if x˜ = sign(
∑k
j=1 y
j ), and k = 100/α2,
we have
〈x˜,x〉 ≥
(
1− 2
a2k
− 2(b − a
2)
a2
)
n
=
(
1− 2
(99α/100)2k
− 2(51α
2/50− (99α/100)2)
(99α/100)2
)
n
=
(
1− 2(100/99)
2
100
− 2
(
(51/50)− (99/100)2
(99/100)2
))
n
≥ 0.89n ≥ n/2.
By Fact 4.4, this proves that M cannot be (1,1/20)-differentially private.
5 Threshold Queries
First we define threshold queries, which are a family of statistical queries.
Definition 5.1. Let ThreshX denote the class of threshold queries over a totally ordered domain
X. That is, ThreshX = {cx : x ∈ X} where cx : X→ {0,1} is defined by cx(y) = 1 iff y ≤ x.
5.1 Separation for Pure Differential Privacy
In this section, we show that the sample complexity of answering adaptively-chosen thresholds
can be exponentially larger than that of answering thresholds offline.
Proposition 5.2 ([DNPR10, CSS11, DNRR15]). Let X be any totally ordered domain. Then there
exists a (ε,0)-differentially private mechanism M that, given x ∈ Xn, gives α-accurate answers to k
offline queries from ThreshX for
n =O
(
min
{
logk + log2(1/α)
αε
,
log2 k
αε
})
On the other hand, we show that answering k adaptively-chosen threshold queries can
require sample complexity as large as Ω(k) – an exponential gap. Note that this matches the
upper bound given by the Laplace mechanism [DMNS06].
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Proposition 5.3. Answering k adaptively-chosen threshold queries on [2k−1] to accuracy α subject to
ε-differential privacy requires sample complexity n =Ω(k/αε).
The idea for the lower bound is that an analyst may adaptively choose k threshold queries to
binary search for an “approximate median” of the dataset. However, a packing argument shows
that locating an approximate median requires sample complexity Ω(k).
Definition 5.4 (Approximate Median). Let X be a totally ordered domain, α > 0, and x ∈ Xn.
We call y ∈ X an α-approximate median of x if
1
n
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : xi ≤ y}∣∣∣ ≥ 12 −α and 1n ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : xi ≥ y}∣∣∣ ≥ 12 −α.
Proposition 5.3 is obtained by combining Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6 below.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose M answers k = d1 + log2T e adaptively-chosen queries from Thresh[T ] with
ε-differential privacy and (α,β)-accuracy. Then there exists an ε-differentially privateM ′ : [T ]n→ [T ]
that computes an α-approximate median with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. The algorithm M ′, formalized in Figure 6, uses M to perform a binary search.
Input: x ∈ Xn.
M is given x.
Initialize `1 = 0, u1 = T , and j = 1.
While uj − `j > 1 repeat:
Let mj = d(uj + `j )/2e.
Give M the query cmj ∈ Thresh[T ] and obtain the answer aj ∈ [0,1].
If aj ≥ 12 , set (`j+1,uj+1) = (`j ,mj ); otherwise set (`j+1,uj+1) = (mj ,uj ).
Increment j.
Output uj .
Figure 6: M ′ : Xn→ X
We have u1 − `1 = T and, after every query j, uj+1 − `j+1 ≤ d(uj − `j)/2e. Since the process
stops when uj − `j = 1, it is easy to verify that M ′ makes at most d1 + log2(T − 1)e queries to M.
Suppose all of the answers given by M are α-accurate. This happens with probability at least
1−β. We will show that, given this, M ′ outputs an α-approximate median, which completes the
proof.
We claim that cuj (x) ≥ 12 −α for all j. This is easily shown by induction. The base case is
cT (x) = 1 ≥ 12 −α. At each step either uj+1 = uj (in which case the induction hypothesis can be
applied) or uj+1 =mj ; in the latter case our accuracy assumption gives
cuj+1(x) = cmj (x) ≥ aj −α ≥
1
2
−α.
We also claim that c`j (x) <
1
2 +α for all j. This follows from a similar induction and completes
the proof.
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Lemma 5.6. Let M : [T ]n → [T ] be an ε-differentially private algorithm that computes an α-
approximate median with confidence 1− β. Then
n ≥Ω
(
logT + log(1/β)
αε
)
.
Proof. Let m = d(12 − α)ne − 1. For each t ∈ [T ], let xt ∈ [T ]n denote the dataset containing m
copies of 1, m copies of T , and n− 2m copies of t. Then for each t ∈ [T ],
P
[
M(xt) = t
]
≥ 1− β.
On the other hand, by the pigeonhole principle, there must exist t∗ ∈ [T − 1] such that
P
[
M(xT ) = t∗
]
≤
P
[
M(xT ) ∈ [T − 1]
]
T − 1 ≤
β
T − 1 .
The inputs xT and xt∗ differ in at most n− 2m ≤ 2αn+ 2 entries. By group privacy,
1− β ≤ P
[
M(xt∗) = t∗
]
≤ eε(2αn+2)P
[
M(xT ) = t∗
]
≤ eε(2αn+2) β
T − 1 .
Rearranging these inequalities gives
O(εαn) ≥ ε(2αn+ 2) ≥ log
(
(1− β)(T − 1)
β
)
≥Ω(log(T /β)),
which yields the result.
Remark 5.7. Proposition 5.3 can be extended to online non-adaptive queries, which yields a
separation between the online non-adaptive and offline models for pure differential privacy and
threshold queries.
The key observation behind remark 5.7 is that, while Lemma 5.5 in general requires making
adaptive queries, for the inputs xt ∈ [T ]n (t ∈ [T ]) used in Lemma 5.6 the queries are “pre-
dictable.” In particular, on input xt, the algorithm M ′ from the proof of Lemma 5.5 will (with
probability at least 1− β) always make the same sequence queries. This allows the queries to be
specified in advance in a non-adaptive manner. More precisely, we can produce an algorithm
M ′t that produces non-adaptive online queries by simulating M ′ on input xt and using those
queries. Given the answers to these online non-adaptive queries, M ′t can either accept or reject
its input depending on whether the answers are consistent with the input xt; M ′t will accept xt
with high probability and reject xt
′
for t′ , t with high probabiliy. The proof of Lemma 5.6 can
be carried out using M ′t∗ instead of M
′ at the end.
5.2 The BetweenThresholds Algorithm
The key technical novelty behind our algorithm for answering adaptively-chosen threshold
queries is a refinement of the “Above Threshold” algorithm [DR14, §3.6], which underlies the
ubiquitous “sparse vector” technique [DNR+09, RR10, DNPR10, HR10].
The sparse vector technique addresses a setting where we have a stream of k (adaptively-
chosen) low-sensitivity queries and a threshold parameter t. Instead of answering all k queries
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accurately, we are interested in answering only the ones that are above the threshold t – for the
remaining queries, we only require a signal that they are below the threshold. Intuitively, one
would expect to only pay in privacy for the queries that are actually above the threshold. And
indeed, one can get away with sample complexity proportional to the number of queries that
are above the threshold, and to the logarithm of the total number of queries.
We extend the sparse vector technique to settings where we demand slightly more informa-
tion about each query beyond whether it is below a single threshold. In particular, we set two
thresholds t` < tu , and for each query, release a signal as to whether the query is below the lower
threshold, above the upper threshold, or between the two thresholds.
As long as the thresholds are sufficiently far apart, whether (the noisy answer to) a query
is below the lower threshold or above the upper threshold is stable, in that it is extremely
unlikely to change on neighboring datasets. As a result, we obtain an (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithm that achieves the same accuracy guarantees as the traditional sparse vector technique,
i.e. sample complexity proportional to logk.
Our algorithm is summarised by the following theorem.6
Theorem 5.8. Let α,β,ε,δ, t ∈ (0,1) and n,k ∈N satisfy
n ≥ 1
αε
max {12log(30/εδ),16log((k + 1)/β)} .
Then there exists a (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm that takes as input x ∈ Xn and answers
a sequence of adaptively-chosen queries q1, · · · ,qk : Xn→ [0,1] of sensitivity 1/n with a1, · · · , a≤k ∈
{L,R,>} such that, with probability at least 1− β,
• aj = L =⇒ qj(x) ≤ t,
• aj = R =⇒ qj(x) ≥ t, and
• aj => =⇒ t −α ≤ qj(x) ≤ t +α.
The algorithm may halt before answering all k queries; however, it only halts after outputting >.
Our algorithm is given in Figure 7. The analysis is split into Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10.
Input: x ∈ Xn.
Parameters: ε, t`, tu ∈ (0,1) and n,k ∈N.
Sample µ ∼ Lap(2/εn) and initialize noisy thresholds tˆ` = t` +µ and tˆu = tu −µ.
For j = 1,2, · · · , k:
Receive query qj : Xn→ [0,1].
Set cj = qj(x) + νj where νj ∼ Lap(6/εn).
If cj < tˆ`, output L and continue.
If cj > tˆu , output R and continue.
If cj ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu], output > and halt.
Figure 7: BetweenThresholds
6In Theorem 5.8, only one threshold is allowed. However, our algorithm is more general and permits the setting
of two thresholds. We have chosen this statement for simplicity.
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Lemma 5.9 (Privacy for BetweenThresholds). Let ε,δ ∈ (0,1) and n ∈N. Then BetweenThresholds
(Figure 7) is (ε,δ)-differentially private for any adaptively-chosen sequence of queries as long as the
gap between the thresholds t`, tu satisfies
tu − t` ≥ 12εn (log(10/ε) + log(1/δ) + 1) .
Lemma 5.10 (Accuracy for BetweenThresholds). Let α,β,ε, t`, tu ∈ (0,1) and n,k ∈N satisfy
n ≥ 8
αε
(log(k + 1) + log(1/β)) .
Then, for any input x ∈ Xn and any adaptively-chosen sequence of queries q1,q2, · · · ,qk, the an-
swers a1, a2, · · ·a≤k produced by BetweenThresholds (Figure 7) on input x satisfy the following with
probability at least 1− β. For any j ∈ [k] such that aj is returned before BetweenThresholds halts,
• aj = L =⇒ qj(x) ≤ t` +α,
• aj = R =⇒ qj(x) ≥ tu −α, and
• aj => =⇒ t` −α ≤ qj(x) ≤ tu +α.
Combining Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10 and setting t` = t −α/2 and tu = t +α/2 yields Theorem 5.8.
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Our analysis is an adaptation of Dwork and Roth’s [DR14, §3.6] analysis of
the AboveThreshold algorithm. Recall that a transcript of the execution of BetweenThresholds is
given by a ∈ {L,R,>}∗. LetM : Xn→ {L,R,>}∗ denote the function that simulates BetweenThresholds
interacting with a given adaptive adversary (cf. Figure 3) and returns the transcript.
Let S ⊂ {L,R,>}∗ be a set of transcripts. Our goal is to show that for adjacent datasets x ∼ x′,
P [M(x) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[M(x′) ∈ S]+ δ.
Let
z∗ = 1
2
(tu − t`)− 6εn log(10/ε)− 1/n ≥
2
εn
log(1/δ).
Our strategy will be to show that as long as the noise value µ is under control, in particular if
µ ≤ z∗, then the algorithm behaves in essentially the same way as the standard AboveThreshold
algorithm. Meanwhile, the event µ > z∗ which corresponds to the (catastrophic) event where the
upper and lower thresholds are too close or overlap, happens with probability at most δ.
The following claim reduces the privacy analysis to examining the probability of obtaining
any single transcript a:
Claim 5.11. Suppose that for any transcript a ∈ {L,R,>}∗, and any z ≤ z∗, that
P [M(x) = a|µ = z] ≤ eε/2P[M(x′) = a|µ = z+ 1/n] .
ThenM is (ε,δ)-differentially private.
Proof. By properties of the Laplace distribution, since µ ∼ Lap(2/εn), for any z ∈R, we have
P [µ = z] ≤ eε/2P [µ = z+ 1/n] ,
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and
P [µ > z∗] = 1
2
e−εnz∗/2 ≤ δ.
Fix a set of transcripts S. Combining these properties allows us to write
P [M(x) ∈ S] =
∫
R
P [M(x) ∈ S |µ = z]P [µ = z]dz
≤
(∫ z∗
−∞
P [M(x) ∈ S |µ = z]P [µ = z]dz
)
+P [µ > z∗]
≤
(
eε/2
∫ z∗
−∞
P
[M(x′) ∈ S |µ = z+ 1/n]P [µ = z]dz)+ δ
≤
(
eε
∫ z∗
−∞
P
[M(x′) ∈ S |µ = z+ 1/n]P [µ = z+ 1/n]dz)+ δ
≤ eεP[M(x′) ∈ S]+ δ
Returning to the proof of Lemma 5.9, fix a transcript a ∈ {L,R,>}∗. Our goal is now to show
thatM satisfies the hypotheses of Claim 5.11, namely that for any z ≤ z∗,
P [M(x) = a|µ = z] ≤ eε/2P[M(x′) = a|µ = z+ 1/n] . (4)
For some k ≥ 1, we can write the transcript a as (a1, a2, . . . , ak), where aj ∈ {L,R} for each j < k,
and ak =>.
For convenience, let A =M(x) and A′ =M(x′). We may decompose
P [M(x) = a|µ = z] = P
[
(∀j < k,Aj = aj ) ∧ qk(x) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z
]
= P
[
(∀j < k,Aj = aj )|µ = z
]
· P
[
qk(x) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z∧ (∀j < k,Aj = aj )
]
.
(5)
We upper bound each factor on the right-hand side separately.
Claim 5.12.
P [(∀i < k,Ai = ai)|µ = z] ≤ P
[
(∀i < k,A′i = ai)|µ = z+ 1/n
]
Proof. For fixed z, let Az(x) denote the set of noise vectors (ν1, . . . ,νk−1) for which (A1, . . . ,Ak−1) =
(a1, . . . , ak−1) when ν = z. We claim that as long as z ≤ z∗, then Az(x) ⊆ Az+1/n(x′). To argue this,
let (ν1, . . . ,νk−1) ∈ Az(x). Fix an index j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and suppose aj = L. Then qj(x) + νj < t` + z,
but since qj has sensitivity 1/n, we also have qj(x′) + νj < t` + (z+ 1/n). Likewise, if aj = R, then
qj(x) + νj > tu − z, so
qj(x
′) + νj > tu − z − 1/n ≥ t` + (z+ 1/n)
as long as z ≤ z∗ ≤ 12 (tu − t`)−1/n. (This ensures thatM(x′) does not output L on the first branch
of the “if” statement, and proceeds to output R.)
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Since Az(x) ⊆ Az+1/n(x′), this proves that
P [(∀i < k,Ai = ai)|µ = z] = P [(ν1, . . . ,νk−1) ∈ Az(x)]
≤ P[(ν1, . . . ,νk−1) ∈ Az+1/n(x′)]
= P
[
(∀i < k,A′i = ai)|µ = z+ 1/n
]
.
Given Claim 5.12, all that is needed to prove (4) and, thereby, prove Lemma 5.9 is to bound
the second factor in (5) — that is, we must only show that
P
[
qk(x) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z∧ (∀j < k,Aj = aj )
]
≤ eε/2P
[
qk(x
′) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z+ 1/n∧ (∀j < k,A′j = aj )
]
.
(6)
Let ∆ = (qk(x′)− qk(x)) ∈ [−1/n,1/n]. Then
P
[
qk(x) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z∧ (∀j < k,Aj = aj )
]
= P [t` + z ≤ qk(x) + νk ≤ tu − z]
= P
[
t` + z+∆ ≤ qk(x′) + νk ≤ tu − z+∆]
= P
[
t` + (z+ 1/n) + (∆− 1/n) ≤ qk(x′) + νk ≤ tu − (z+ 1/n) + (∆+ 1/n)]
= P
[
qk(x
′) + νk ∈ [tˆ` +∆− 1/n, tˆu +∆+ 1/n]|µ = z+ 1/n
]
≤ eε/2P
[
qk(x
′) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z+ 1/n
]
= eε/2P
[
qk(x
′) + νk ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu]|µ = z+ 1/n∧ (∀j < k,A′j = aj )
]
where the last inequality follows from Claim 5.13 below (setting η = 2/n, λ = 6/εn, [a,b] = [tˆ`, tˆu],
and [a′ ,b′] = [tˆ` +∆ − 1/n, tˆu +∆+ 1/n]) and the fact that z ≤ z∗ = 12 (tu − t`) − 6εn log(10/ε) − 1/n
implies
b − a = tˆu − tˆ` = tu − t` − 2µ ≥ 12εn log
(10
ε
)
≥ 2λ log
( 1
1− e−ε/6
)
whenever 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1.
Claim 5.13. Let ν ∼ Lap(λ) and let [a,b], [a′ ,b′] ⊂ R be intervals satisfying [a,b] ⊂ [a′ ,b′]. If
η ≥ (b′ − a′)− (b − a), then
P
[
ν ∈ [a′ ,b′]] ≤ eη/λ
1− e−(b−a)/2λ ·P [ν ∈ [a,b]] .
Proof. Recall that the probability density function of the Laplace distribution is given by
fλ(x) =
1
2λe
−|x|/λ. There are four cases to consider: In the first case, a < b ≤ 0. In the second case,
a < 0 < b with |a| ≤ |b|. In the third case, 0 ≤ a < b. Finally, in the fourth case, a < 0 < b with
|a| ≥ |b|. Since the Laplace distribution is symmetric, it suffices to analyze the first two cases.
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Case 1: Suppose a < b ≤ 0. Then
P
[
ν ∈ [a′ ,b′]] ≤ P [ν ∈ [a,b]] +∫ b+η
b
1
2λ
ex/λdx
=
1
2
(e(b+η)/λ − ea/λ)
=
1
2
·
(
eη/λ − e(a−b)/λ
1− e(a−b)/λ
)
· (eb/λ − ea/λ)
=
(
eη/λ − e−(b−a)/λ
1− e−(b−a)/λ
)
·P [ν ∈ [a,b]] .
Case 2: Suppose a < 0 < b and |a| ≤ |b|. Note that this implies b ≥ (b − a)/2. Then
P
[
ν ∈ [a′ ,b′]] ≤ P [ν ∈ [a,b]] + η · 1
2λ
ea/λ
≤ P [ν ∈ [a,b]]
1 + η2λ ea/λP [ν ∈ [0,b]]

= P [ν ∈ [a,b]] 1− e
−b/λ + ηλe
a/λ
1− e−b/λ
≤ P [ν ∈ [a,b]] 1 + η/λ
1− e−b/λ
≤ P [ν ∈ [a,b]] e
η/λ
1− e−(b−a)/2λ .
Proof of Lemma 5.10. We claim that it suffices to show that with probability at least 1 − β we
have
∀1 ≤ j ≤ k |νj |+ |µ| ≤ α.
To see this, suppose |νj |+ |µ| ≤ α for every j. Then, if aj = L, we have
cj = qj(x) + νj < tˆ` = t` +µ, whence qj(x) < t` + |µ|+ |νj | ≤ t` +α.
Similarly, if aj = R, then
cj = qj(x) + νj > tˆu = tu −µ, whence qj(x) > tu − (|µ|+ |νj |) ≥ tu −α.
Finally, if aj =>, then
cj = qj(x) + νj ∈ [tˆ`, tˆu] = [t` +µ,tu −µ], whence t` −α ≤ qj(x) ≤ tu +α.
We now show that indeed |νj |+ |µ| ≤ α for every j with high probability. By tail bounds for
the Laplace distribution,
P [|µ| > α/4] = exp
(
−εαn
8
)
and P
[
|νj | > 3α/4
]
= exp
(
−εαn
8
)
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for all j. By a union bound,
P
[
|µ| > α/4 ∨ ∃j ∈ [k] |νj | > 3α/4
]
≤ (k + 1) · exp
(
−εαn
8
)
≤ β,
as required.
5.3 The Online Interior Point Problem
Our algorithm extends a result of [BNSV15] showing how to reduce the problem of privately
releasing thresholds to the much simpler interior point problem. By analogy, our algorithm
for answering adaptively-chosen thresholds relies on solving multiple instances of an online
variant of the interior point problem in parallel. In this section, we present the OIP problem and
give an (ε,δ)-differentially private solution that can handle k adaptively-chosen queries with
sample complexity O(logk). Our OIP algorithm is a direct application of the BetweenThresholds
algorithm from Section 5.2.
Definition 5.14 (Online Interior Point Problem). An algorithm M solves the Online Interior
Point (OIP) Problem for k queries with confidence β if, when given as input any private dataset
x ∈ [0,1]n and any adaptively-chosen sequence of real numbers y1, · · · , yk ∈ [0,1], with probability
at least 1− β it produces a sequence of answers a1, · · · , ak ∈ {L,R} such that
∀j ∈ {1,2, · · · , k} yj <min
i∈[n]
xi =⇒ aj = L, yj ≥max
i∈[n]
xi =⇒ aj = R .
(If mini∈[n] xi ≤ yj <maxi∈[n] xi , then M may output either symbol L or R.)
Input: Dataset x ∈ [0,1]n.
Initialize a BetweenThresholds instance (Figure 7) B on dataset x with thresholds t` = 13 ,
tu =
2
3 .
For j = 1,2, · · · , k:
Receive query yj ∈ [0,1].
If B already halted on some query qy∗ , output L if yj < y∗ and output R if yj ≥ y∗.
Otherwise, give B the query cyj ∈ Thresh[0,1].
If B returns >, output R. Otherwise, output the answer produced by B.
Figure 8: Online Interior Point Algorithm
Proposition 5.15. The algorithm in Figure 8 is (ε,δ)-differentially private and solves the OIP Problem
with confidence β as long as
n ≥ 36
ε
(log(k + 1) + log(1/β) + log(10/ε) + log(1/δ) + 1) .
Proof. Privacy follows immediately from Lemma 5.9, since Algorithm 8 is obtained by post-
processing Algorithm 7, run using thresholds with a gap of size 1/3.
To argue utility, let α = 1/3 so that
n ≥ 8
εα
(log(k + 1) + log(1/β)).
By Lemma 5.10, with probability at least 1− β, the following events occur:
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• If the BetweenThresholds instance B halts when it is queried on cy∗ , then mini∈[n] xi ≤ y∗ <
maxi∈[n] xi .
• If B has not yet halted and yj <mini∈[n] xi , its answer to cyj is L.
• If B has not yet halted and yj ≥maxi∈[n] xi , its answer to cyj is R.
Thus, if B has not yet halted, the answers provided are accurate answers for the OIP Problem.
On the other hand, when B halts, it has successfully identified an “interior point” of the dataset
x, i.e. a y∗ such that mini∈[n] xi ≤ y∗ <maxi∈[n] xi . Thus, for any subsequent query y, we have that
y <min
i∈[n]
xi =⇒ y < y∗,
so Algorithm 8 correctly outputs L. Similarly,
y ≥max
i∈[n]
xi =⇒ y ≥ y∗,
so Algorithm 8 correctly outputs R on such a query.
5.4 Releasing Adaptive Thresholds with Approximate Differential Privacy
We are now ready to state our reduction from releasing thresholds to solving the OIP Problem.
Theorem 5.16. If there exists an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm solving the OIP problem for k
queries with confidence αβ/8 and sample complexity n′, then there is a (4ε, (1 + eε)δ)-differentially
private algorithm for releasing k threshold queries with (α,β)-accuracy and sample complexity
n = max
{
6n′
α
,
24log2.5(4/α) · log(2/β)
αε
}
.
Combining this reduction with our algorithm for the OIP Problem (Proposition 5.15) yields:
Corollary 5.17. There is an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm for releasing k adaptively-chosen
threshold queries with (α,β)-accuracy for
n =O
(
logk + log2.5(1/α) + log(1/βεδ)
αε
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5.16. Our algorithm and its analysis follow the reduction of Bun et al. [BNSV15]
for reducing the (offline) query release problem for thresholds to the offline interior point prob-
lem.
Let T be an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm solving the OIP Problem with confidence
αβ/8 and sample complexity n′. Without loss of generality, we may assume that T is differentially
private in “add-or-remove-an-item sense”—i.e. if x ∈ [0,1]∗ and x′ differs from x up to the
addition or removal of a row, then for every adversary A and set S of outcomes of the interaction
between A and T , we have P
[
AdaptiveA→←T (x) ∈ S
]
≤ eεP
[
AdaptiveA→←T (x
′) ∈ S
]
+ δ. Moreover,
T provides accurate answers to the OIP Problem with probability at least 1−αβ/8 whenever
its input is of size at least n′. To force an algorithm T to have these properties, we may pad
any dataset of size less than n′ with an arbitrary fixed element. On the other hand, we may
subsample the first n′ elements from any dataset with more than this many elements.
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Input: Dataset x ∈ [0,1]n.
Parameter: α ∈ (0,1).
Let (x(1), . . . ,x(M))←R Partition(x1, . . . ,xn,α).
Initialize an instance of the OIP algorithm T (m) on each chunk x(m) ∈ [0,1]∗, for m ∈ [M].
For each j = 1, · · · , k:
Receive query cyj ∈ Thresh[0,1].
Give query yj ∈ [0,1] to every OIP instance T (m), receiving answers a(1)j , · · · , a(M)j ∈ {L,R}.
Return aj =
1
M ·
∣∣∣∣∣{m ∈ [M] : a(m)j = R}∣∣∣∣∣.
Figure 9: AdaptiveThresholdsT
Input: Dataset x ∈ [0,1]n.
Parameter: α ∈ (0,1).
Output: (Random) partition (x(1), . . . ,x(M)) ∈ ([0,1]∗)M of x, where 2/α ≤M < 4/α.
Let M = 2dlog2(2/α)e.
Sort x in nondecreasing order x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn.
For each 0 ≤ ` ≤ log2M and s ∈ {0,1}`, sample νs ∼ Lap((log2M)/ε) independently.
For each 1 ≤ m ≤M − 1, let ηm = ∑s∈P (m)νs, where P (m) is the set of all prefixes of the
binary representation of m.
Let t0 = 1, t1 =
⌊
n
M + η1
⌋
, · · · , tm =
⌊
m·n
M + ηm
⌋
, · · · , tM = n+ 1.
Let x(m) = (xtm−1 , . . . ,xtm−1) for all m ∈ [M].
Figure 10: Partition
Consider the algorithm AdaptiveThresholdsT in Figures 9 and 10.
The proof of Theorem 5.16 relies on the following two claims about the Partition subroutine,
both of which are implicit in the work of Bun et al. [BNSV15, Appendix C] and are based on
ideas of Dwork et al. [DNPR10]. Claim 5.18 shows that for neighboring databases x ∼ x′, the
behaviors of the Partition subroutine on x and x′ are “similar” the following sense: for any fixed
partition of x, one is roughly as likely (over the randomness of the partition algorithm) to obtain
a partition of x′ that differs on at most two chunks, where the different chunks themselves differ
only up to the addition or removal of a single item. This will allow us to show that running M
parallel copies of the OIP algorithm on the chunks remains roughly (ε,δ)-differentially private.
Claim 5.19 shows that, with high probability, each chunk is simultaneously large enough for
the corresponding OIP algorithm to succeed, but also small enough so that treating all of the
elements in a chunk as if they were the same element still permits us to get α-accurate answers
to arbitrary threshold queries.
Claim 5.18. Fix neighboring datasets x,x′ ∈ [0,1]n. Then there exists a (measurable) bijection
ϕ :R2M →R2M with the following properties:
1. Let z ∈R2M be any noise vector. Let x(1), . . . ,x(M) denote the partition of x obtained with random
noise set to ν = z. Similarly, let x′(1), . . . ,x′(M) denote the partition of x′ obtained under noise
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ν = ϕ(z). Then there exist indices i1, i2 such that: 1) For i ∈ {i1, i2}, the chunks x(i) and x′(i)
differ up to the addition or removal of at most one item and 2) For every index i < {i1, i2}, we
have x(i) = x′(i).
2. For every noise vector z ∈R2M , we have P [ν = ϕ(z)] ≤ e2εP [ν = z].
Claim 5.19. With probability at least 1− β/2, we have that |tm −m ·n/M | ≤ αn/24 for all m ∈ [M].
Privacy of Algorithm 9. We first show how to use Claim 5.18 to show that Algorithm 9 is
differentially private. Fix an adversary A, and let B = AdaptiveA→←AdaptiveThresholdsT simulate the
interaction between A and Algorithm 9. Let S be a subset of the range of B. Then, by Property
(1) of Claim 5.18 and group privacy, we have that for any z ∈R2M :
P [B(x) ∈ S |ν = z] ≤ e2εP[B(x′) ∈ S |ν = ϕ(z)]+ (1 + eε)δ.
By Property (2) of Claim 5.18, we also have Pr[ν = z] ≤ e2εPr[ν = ϕ(z)] for every z ∈ R2M .
Therefore,
P [B(x) ∈ S] =
∫
R2M
P [B(x) ∈ S |ν = z] ·P [ν = z]dz
≤
∫
R2M
(
e2εP
[
B(x′) ∈ S |ν = ϕ(z)]+ (1 + eε)δ) ·P [ν = z]dz
≤ (1 + eε)δ+
∫
R2M
e2εP
[
B(x′) ∈ S |ν = ϕ(z)] · e2εP [ν = ϕ(z)]dz
≤ (1 + eε)δ+ e4εP[B(x′) ∈ S] .
Hence, B is (e4ε, (1 + eε)δ)-differentially private, as claimed.
Accuracy of Algorithm 9. We now show how to use Claim 5.19 to show that Algorithm 9
produces (α,β)-accurate answers. By a union bound, the following three events occur with
probability at least 1− β:
1. For all m ∈ [M], ∣∣∣ mM − tmn ∣∣∣ ≤ α6 .
2. Every chunk x(m) has size |x(m)| = tm − tm−1 ∈ [αn/6,2αn/3].
3. Every instance of T succeeds.
Now we need to show that if these three events occur, we can produce α-accurate answers
to every threshold query cy1 , . . . , cyk . Write the sorted input database as x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn. We
consider two cases for the jth query: As our first case, suppose xn ≤ yj . Then for every chunk
x(m), we have max{x(m)} ≤ yj . Then the success condition of T (m) guarantees that a(m)j = R. Thus,
the answer aj = 1 is (exactly) accurate for the query cj .
As our second case, let i be the smallest index for which xi > yj , and suppose the item xi is
in some chunk x(mi ). Note that this means that the true answer to the query cyj is (i − 1)/n and
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that tmi−1 ≤ i ≤ tmi − 1. Then again, for every m <mi we have max{x(m)} ≤ yj , so every such T (m)
instance yields a(m)j = R. Thus,
aj =
1
M
·
∣∣∣∣∣{m ∈ [M] : a(m)j = R}∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ mi − 1M ≥ tmin − α6 − α2 ≥ (i − 1)n −α,
since M ≥ 2/α.
On the other hand, for every m > mi , we have min{x(m)} > yj , so every such T (m) instance
instead yields a(m)j = L.
aj ≤ miM ≤
tmi
n
+
α
6
≤ tmi−1 + 2αn/3
n
+
α
6
≤ i
n
+
2α
3
+
α
6
≤ i − 1
n
+α,
since n ≥ 6/α.
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A The Fingerprinting Lemma
In this section we prove the fingerprinting lemma (Lemma 3.6). The proof is broken into several
lemmata.
Lemma A.1. Let f : {±1}n→R. Define g : [±1]→R by
g(p) = E
x1···n∼p
[f (x)] .
Then
E
x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p)
 = g ′(p) · (1− p2).
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A rescaling of this lemma appears in [SU15b]. The following proof is taken from [DSS+15].
Proof. We begin by establishing several identities.
Since x2 = 1 for x ∈ {±1}, we have the identity
d
dp
1 + xp
2
=
x
2
=
1 + xp
2
x − p
1− p2
for all x ∈ {±1} and p ∈ (−1,1). By the product rule, we have
d
dp
∏
i∈[n]
1 + xip
2
=
∑
i∈[n]
(
d
dp
1 + xip
2
) ∏
k∈[n]\{i}
1 + xkp
2
=
∑
i∈[n]
xi − p
1− p2
∏
k∈[n]
1 + xkp
2
for all x ∈ {±1}n and p ∈ (−1,1).
Sampling x ∼ p samples each x ∈ {±1} with probability 1+xp2 . Thus sampling x1···n ∼ p,
samples each x ∈ {±1}n with probability ∏i∈[n] 1+xip2 .
Now we can write
g(p) = E
x1···n∼p
[f (x)] =
∑
x∈{±1}n
f (x)
∏
i∈[n]
1 + xip
2
.
Using the above identities gives
g ′(p) =
∑
x∈{±1}n
f (x)
d
dp
∏
i∈[n]
1 + xip
2
=
∑
x∈{±1}n
f (x)
∑
i∈[n]
xi − p
1− p2
∏
k∈[n]
1 + xkp
2
= E
x1···n∼p
f (x) ∑
i∈[n]
xi − p
1− p2

Lemma A.2. Let g : [±1]→R be a polynomial. Then
E
p∈[±1]
[
g ′(p) · (1− p2)
]
= 2 E
p∈[±1]
[g(p) · p] .
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Proof. Let u(p) = 1− p2. By integration by parts and the fundamental theorem of calculus,
E
p∈[±1]
[
g ′(p) · (1− p2)
]
=
1
2
∫ 1
−1
g ′(p)(1− p2)dp
=
1
2
∫ 1
−1
g ′(p)u(p)dp
=
1
2
∫ 1
−1
(
d
dp
g(p)u(p)
)
− g(p)u′(p)dp
=
1
2
(g(1)u(1)− g(−1)u(−1))− 1
2
∫ 1
−1
g(p)(−2p)dp
=0 +
∫ 1
−1
g(p)pdp
=2 E
p∈[±1]
[g(p) · p] .
Proposition A.3. Let f : {±1}n→R. Then
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p) + (f (x)− x)2
 ≥ 13 .
Proof. Define g : [±1]→R by
g(p) = E
x1···n∼p
[f (x)] .
By Lemmas A.1 and A.2,
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p)
 = Ep∈[±1] [g ′(p)(1− p2)] = Ep∈[±1] [2g(p)p] .
Moreover, by Jensen’s inequality,
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
[
(f (x)− x)2
]
≥ E
p∈[±1]
( Ex1···n∼p [f (x)− x]
)2
= E
p∈[±1]
[
(g(p)− p)2
]
= E
p∈[±1]
[
g(p)2 − 2g(p)p+ p2
]
= E
p∈[±1]
[
g(p)2
]
− E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p)
+ 13 .
Rearranging yields the result:
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p) + (f (x)− x)2
 ≥ Ep∈[±1] [g(p)2]+ 13 ≥ 13 .
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We also have an alternative version of Proposition A.3:
Proposition A.4. Let f : {±1}n→R. Then
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p) + (f (x)− p)2
 ≥ 13 .
Proof. Define g : [±1]→R by
g(p) = E
x1···n∼p
[f (x)] .
By Lemmas A.1 and A.2,
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p)
 = Ep∈[±1] [g ′(p)(1− p2)] = Ep∈[±1] [2g(p)p] .
Moreover,
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
[
(f (x)− p)2
]
= E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
[
f (x)2 − 2g(p)p+ p2
]
≥ 0− E
p∈[±1]
[2g(p)p] +
1
3
.
The result follows by combining the above equality and inequality.
Finally we restate and prove Lemma 3.6
Lemma A.5 (Fingerprinting Lemma). Let f : {±1}n→ [±1]. Then
E
p∈[±1],x1···n∼p
f (x) ·∑
i∈[n]
(xi − p) + 2 |f (x)− x|
 ≥ 13 .
Proof. Since |f (x)− x| ≤ 2, we have |f (x)− x|2 ≤ 2 |f (x)− x|. The result thus follows from Proposi-
tion A.3.
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